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The conflict over the extent to which climate change should be a pressing priority for 
the development community is increasing in intensity. While many claim that global 
warming ‘will cancel out western aid and devastate Africa’,
2  or as DfiD claim 
presents ‘the biggest threat facing the world’,
3 sceptics take the view that ‘climate 
change can wait’, especially in light of seemingly more urgent issues as health
4. A 
more balanced view would be that given the intimate relationship between climate 
change and economic growth, human health, poverty and access to key livelihood 
resources, we have to address both simultaneously, especially given the capacity of 
climate change to reverse progress in these other areas (see table 1). Amid this 
polarisation and controversy, the development community is struggling to develop 
effective responses to the dual, and increasingly inter-related, challenges of tackling 
poverty and combating climate change. 
  
 
Table 1: Climate Change and Poverty 
 
•  Food production needs to double to meet the needs of an additional 3 billion people in 
the next 30 years. Climate change is projected to decrease agricultural productivity in 
the tropics and sub-tropics. 
•  One-third of the world’s population is susceptible to water scarcity. Populations 
facing water scarcity will more than double over the next 30 years. Climate change is 
projected to decrease water availability in many (semi) arid regions 
•  Wood fuel is the main source of fuel for one third of the world’s population. Wood 
demand is expected to double in the next 50 years. Climate change will make forest 
management more difficult due to increases in pests and fires 
•  Today 1.6 billion people are without electricity. Electricity demand in developing 
countries will increase three to five times over the next 30 years. Fossil-fuel based 
electricity production will exacerbate climate change.  
 
Source: Davidson et al 2003. 
 
 
Until very recently climate change has been neglected by donors, seen as having only 
tangential relevance to the work of the aid industry. According to Shardul Agrawala 
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of the OECD, for example, there has been ‘limited or no attention to climate change 
in national planning, donor documents and PRSPs’ (Agrawala 2004). The untenability 
of that position has become increasingly obvious to those charged with providing 
disaster relief in areas struck by extreme weather events or devastated by slower, but 
no less disruptive, processes of climate-induced changes to agricultural production 
and rainfall. The findings contained in the latest IPCC
5  report on the impacts of 
climate change demonstrate quite clearly that poorer and marginalised communities in 
drought prone areas, those experiencing water scarcity or those whose livelihoods 
depend on agriculture will be the worst affected and have the least capacity to adapt.
6 
As IPCC lead author Neil Adger notes, ‘the impacts of climate change are likely to be 
greater on those countries more dependent on primary sector economic activities 
[mostly farming], primarily because of the increase in uncertainty on productivity in 
the primary sectors.’
7  Changes in the supply of water, natural resources and food 
bring in their wake enormous social changes and disruptions. Within the global South, 
it is areas of sub-Saharan Africa where poverty is most acute that will be worst 
affected still.  
 
Intersections with other issues such as conflict and war, which have a long history,
8 
have re-surfaced as drought and resource scarcity, conditions exacerbated by climate 
change, are seen to fuel the conflict in Darfur and elsewhere. Some have claimed that 
‘Climate change is arguably the most persistent threat to global stability in the coming 
century’.
9 Yet should climate related conflicts intensify, studies suggest they will tend 
to be in weak states and climate sensitive regions, those areas of the world in other 
words in which some of the poorest people live.
10 In so far as conflict amounts to 
development in reverse, instabilities exacerbated by climate change have the potential 
to deepen this destruction.  
 
For this reasons climate change is increasingly recognised as one of the most serious 
threats currently facing humankind and its poorest members in particular. Indeed, a 
multi-donor report on Poverty and Climate Change rightly acknowledges that 
‘Climate change is a serious risk to poverty reduction and threatens to undo decades 
of development efforts’.
11 The relative lack of action to date has less to do with the 
painfully slow diplomatic processes required to secure global agreement on solutions 
to the problem than to the vested interests, governments included, that benefit, in the 
short term at least, from doing nothing. Providing the right incentives for governments 
and in particular the private sector actors whose investments in energy, industry and 
transport, as well, as the new carbon economy, will largely determine the fate of this 
issue in the years to come, presents a huge policy challenge. As Geoffrey Heal notes 
carbon dioxide is produced as a result of ‘billions of decentralised and independent 
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decisions by private households for heating and transportation and by corporations for 
these and other needs, all outside the government sphere. The government can 
influence these decisions, but only indirectly through regulations or incentives’.
12 
 
In short, we are used to thinking about fossil fuel energy as a pre-requisite to 
development not a threat to it. De-carbonising the global economy without threatening 
the well-being of the billions of poor people who have contributed hardly anything to 
climate change requires change at every level from local government to the United 
Nations as well as the concerted efforts of a range of non-state business and civil 
society actors.  
 
Non-state actors in Climate Governance 
 
The role of bilaterals and multilaterals 
 
Above and beyond other development actors, the World Bank has the potential to 
finance a number of important climate protection initiatives, as well as reduce the 
climate-changing impact of existing development strategies. In addition to being an 
implementing agency of the Global Environment Facility, the financing agency for 
the climate agreements, the Bank has a separate Climate Change Programme initially 
made up of three components: Climate Change Overlays Programme; World Bank 
AIJ programme and the Global Carbon Initiative. The Bank also has a Clean Coal 
Initiative intended to encourage the use of ‘environmentally-friendly’ coal 
technologies and runs ‘EMPower Info’, a focal point for information about 
environmental assessment processes, the environmental impacts of different energy 
sources and about pollution mitigation technologies.  
 
Inducing investors to invest in poorer and riskier areas is a potentially important 
contribution of the World Bank. The Community Development Carbon Fund 
launched by the World Bank at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
2002, with initial capital of $128.6 million, is intended to encourage CDM-like 
development focussed project funding. The CDCF provides financial support to 
small-scale emission reduction projects through the CDM in the least developed 
countries and poorest communities within the developing world.  
 
The Bank is also playing a part in advancing the goals of the global climate regime by 
launching a Prototype Carbon Fund, with investments from private sector firms, 
intended to facilitate acquisitions and transfers of credits from the flexible 
mechanisms created by the Kyoto Protocol. The PCF has been operational since 2000 
with a range of governments contributing over $180 million to its financing. The PCF 
has shareholders from the public and private sectors and was set up to create carbon 
as an asset for trading in the marketplace. The idea is that trading in carbon credits 
allows countries to earn export revenue. The PCF is the only buyer in the market and 
is inundated with deals from developing countries such that deals worth $350 million 
are under review. Ken Newcombe from PCF claims that while the market is growing 
in sophistication and complexity, the key constraint is keeping up with business and 
maintaining the capacity to monitor the quality of the assets. Nevertheless he suggests 
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that technologies such as hydro and wind power have received an enormous boost 
from carbon financing.
13At a regional level the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the Franco-Belgian banking group Dexia have also launched a new 
private equity fund aimed at reducing energy consumption and emissions of 
greenhouse gases in Central and Eastern Europe.
14 
 
There are a number of barriers to the World Bank making a greater contribution to the 
financing of climate action, however. One of the most serious, is the failure of 
effective policy integration; the lack of systematic integration of the goals of climate 
change protection into mainstream lending activities. According to Tellam 
‘progressive initiatives are very small compared to the Bank’s overall portfolio’ and 
are generally dependent upon external funding from developed country governments 
rather than being wholly supported financially by the Bank.
15 The fact that sustainable 
energy initiatives are externally driven for the most part, helps to explain why they are 
poorly integrated within core Bank activities and tend to be ‘sealed off’ from 
traditional operations. The Bank has, to some extent, acknowledged this weakness in 
its paper on Energy Efficiency and Conservation in the Developing World: The World 
Bank’s Role, where it is recommended that energy efficiency and renewables should 




If policy integration is understood in its truest sense, however, the climate impacts of 
all World Bank policies should be factored into their formulation including policies of 
energy market deregulation. The Bank concedes ‘unregulated electricity markets are 
likely to put renewable energy technologies at a disadvantage in the short-run because 
they favour the cheapest energy as determined purely by price, but do not capture 
environmental and social externalities’.
17 In other words, the ecological spill-overs 
from existing policies are not currently internalised.
18 One report found that less than 
10% of all Bank projects are screened for their impact on the climate.
19 Between 1995 
and 1997 the Bank invested $2.24 billion on the coal sector while over the same 
period just $61 million was spent on demand-side management and only $5.9 million 
on one renewable project.
20 Since 1992, the World Bank has spent 25 times more on 
climate-changing fossil fuels than on renewables and the fossil fuel projects the World 
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Bank has financed will over the next 20 to 50 years add carbon dioxide emissions to 




To achieve a higher level of policy integration then, climate objectives, and 
environmental goals more broadly, need to be placed on a par with traditional Bank 
business. This would include goals relating to funding levels of GEF associated 
projects and integration into its sector work and the Country Assistance Strategy 
process, for example. A report on the GEF commenting on the Bank’s activities also 
found that it had not ‘taken steps to create staff incentives necessary to put global 
environmental concerns on a par with traditional bank business; that it is has not 
systematically integrated global environmental objectives into economic and sector 
work or into the Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) process, and that it has not 
adequately addressed the impact on the global environment of its financing of fossil 
fuel power development’.
22 Clearly, much remains to be done. 
 
The climate-related activities of bilateral aid agencies have also come under 
increasing scrutiny. As a result, climate change considerations have also been finding 
their way into traditional ODA programmes such as the German Agency for 
Technical Cooperation’s climate change programme (Measures to Implement the 
FCCC). The programme selects developing countries with high levels of GHG 
emissions such as China and South Africa and targets their energy sectors with 
projects and programmes aimed at climate change protection. Similarly USAID has 
developed a ‘Climate Change Initiative’ providing grants to address, among other 
things, policy reform, institutional capacity-building and technology cooperation and 
transfer. The ‘Development Credit Authority’ has also been evolved providing 
guarantees to help project developers overcome market barriers.
23 There is increasing 
evidence, therefore, of development agencies screening their project portfolios to both 
ascertain, firstly, the extent to which existing development projects already consider 
climate risks or address vulnerability to climate variability and change and, secondly, 
to identify opportunities for incorporating climate change explicitly into future 
projects. Adaptation considerations have generally been neglected to date, however.
24 
Aid, grants and subsidies will nevertheless continue to be important, particularly to 
developing countries, for financing climate-relevant technology transfer projects. The 
financial flows they oversee pale into insignificance, however, when compared to the 
private sector. 
 
The role of the private sector 
 
Given the decline in ODA, much emphasis is placed on the importance of private 
transfers to developing countries in making up for gaps in public financing. It is 
difficult to over-state the importance of the private sector in proposals to address 
climate change. As the Business Council for Sustainable Development 
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acknowledges;
25  `Industry accounts for more than one third of energy consumed 
world-wide and uses more energy than any other end-user in industrialised and newly 
industrialising economies'.
26  The UNFCCC secretariat report on this issue 
acknowledges the difficulty of analysing the investment pattern of FDI by climate-
relevant sectors as its distribution in developing countries is not well documented and 
the statistics on the transfer of ESTs and their impact on GHGs is difficult to 
determine.
27  Nevertheless, the Asian Development Bank found that almost three-
quarters of private investment in low-income countries between 1990 and 1997 has 
gone into constructing new power generation plants using fossil fuels, while the 
remaining 25% has gone into existing energy utilities. Only a relatively tiny amount 
of private investment has been made in energy efficiency or renewable energy.
28 
Nevertheless, introducing emission ceilings at firm level alongside international 
emission trading systems could have a significant impact on the corporate strategies 
and production planning of firms.  
 
A key role for the World Bank and other donors is to create incentives for the private 
sector to carry some of the burden of funding climate protection given that firms can 
benefit both economically and by being part of the global community that benefits 
from climate protection. Despite being expected to lead the way, the problem is that 
many private investors have little experience with sustainable energy, which they 
view as high risk. Piloting and demonstrating sustainable energy projects is a key 
function that Banks and development agencies can perform to minimise some of the 
risks that deter private actors from investing in public goods.
29  The Bank, the IFC 
(the Bank’s private lending arm) and US-based private foundations, for example, have 
set up a Solar Development Corporation towards this end. Its aim is to provide 
business development services to local solar entrepreneurs and to provide credit for 
both solar businesses and purchasers of solar home systems.
30 However, during the 
1990s, only about 7% of the IFC’s energy lending went to renewables and energy-
efficiency projects. 
 
There is, nevertheless, already a great deal of evidence of companies taking voluntary 
action on climate change to reduce their emissions, capitalising on the economic 
savings to be made and the public relations credit to be earned from being seen to take 
a lead on the issue. Chemicals giant Du Pont reduced its emissions by 65% below 
their 1990 level while IBM saved $115 million since 1998 through cutting its carbon 
emissions. A number of NGOs such as the Climate Group in the UK and the Pew 
Centre in the US have played an important role in making the business case for action 
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on climate change and publicising the benefits achieved by existing leaders in the 
field. Some firms such as BP and Shell have gone so far as to establish their own 
intra-firm trading systems which encourage competitive reductions between different 
parts of the firm.
31 This carries benefits such as saving money through reduced use of 
energy, first-mover advantages that come from developing new technologies and 
production processes to meet the targets and public and employee credibility from 
being seen as an environmentally-responsible company.
32 Companies have also been 
keen participants in schemes such as the Chicago Climate Exchange, the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme, the Carbon Disclosure Project and discussions about a 
possible Carbon Certification Council to oversee a labelling scheme aimed at 
consumers emulating existing schemes in the forestry and fisheries sectors.  
 
Another area of private finance is attracting increasing attention in the climate change 
debate; the financial community. Those pushing for tougher action on climate change 
have increasingly been forging alliances with insurance companies and banks 
encouraging them to shift their lending away from fossil fuels and into renewables.
33 
The aim is to mobilise the finance sector itself to bring about the shifts in industry 
necessary to promote more sustainable and climate-benign forms of energy 
production. There are some indications that the financial community is changing, 
albeit very slowly, and starting to make climate impacts a feature in their investment 
choices. The insurance industry has a particular stake in promoting these changes 
given that it has suffered in the past and will continue to suffer huge losses from pay-
outs following climate-related damage to properties that they have insured. For 
example, by 1995 ‘leading insurers from all the world’s main insurance centres had 
spoken of the threat of bankruptcy from unmanageable catastrophe losses’.
34 This 
came on the back of hurricane Andrew in 1992 which cost the insurance industry $20 
billion in pay-outs on weather-related damage.
35 The fragile alliance between sections 
of the financial community and environmentalists seeking to advance action on 
climate change provides one example of the type of political coalition that will be 
necessary to carry reforms forward. It also underlines the point that many of the key 
changes necessary to fund climate protection and deter activities that accelerate 
climate change, will come not from more international cooperation alone, but from 
changes in industry itself and in this case from pressure from stakeholders with a clear 
self-interest in promoting action.  
 
Many of the changes in company policy are consumer-driven and we should not 
under-estimate the importance of consumer choice and consumer pressure in driving 
private sector action on climate change. On one level, consumers themselves have to 
internalise the externalities that they impose on the environment through their 
consumer choices. One way they can internalise those externalities is by supporting 
markets for climate-benign products and refusing to purchase goods and services 
which imply a heavy impact on the climate, as well as changing their own patterns of 
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consumption in relation to energy use, transportation and the like. Many NGOs have 
sought to supplement government efforts to persuade consumers to use energy more 
efficiently by providing booklets and other information materials on how savings can 
be made from changing simple household practices. Development NGOs such as 
Christian Aid in the UK have also launched campaigns making people aware of the 
difference small changes in their consumption of energy can make to people in the 
South. In a more confrontational manner some groups have also organised boycotts of 
firms that continue to oppose the Kyoto Protocol, encouraging consumers to use their 
purchasing power to register their disapproval with companies’ obstruction of 
international action on climate change.
36 
 
Governments can also facilitate private sector voluntary action through education and 
awareness-raising, as well as by providing financial incentives such as tax breaks and 
other forms of support to companies willing to accept GHG reduction obligations. To 
do this credibly governments have to recognise and address their own contribution to 
the problem of climate change. State enterprises are themselves major sources of 
pollution either directly through public production, consumption and investment or 
indirectly through subsidisation of polluting activities and policies not integrated with 




Besides the use of government incentives to encourage private sector investment in 
climate benign developments, discussed above, and those sections of the private 
sector that have their own interests at stake in acting on climate change, there is also a  
potential role for screening state support to the private sector and multilateral 
development banks. Export Credit Agencies have the capacity to define and utilise 
environmental criteria to control and, if necessary, restrict investments made by 
MDBs if the political will is there to use this approach. Civil society pressure can help 
in this regard. In the late 1980s, environmentalists successfully mobilised U.S 




One, potentially very powerful critique of this argument, would be that what is being 
suggested here would amount to climate conditionalities that would merely add to the 
burden of the poorest countries when so many people are without access to energy of 
any sort. By placing the idea of tackling energy poverty centrally, however, it 
becomes harder to justify large scale coal-fired or oil sector projects on the grounds 
that they help to meet the needs of the poor. In so far as the plentiful supply of cheap 
energy is central to sustaining the lives of the urban poor in particular, there may be a 
case, but even here in the context of simultaneous World Bank and IMF pressures to 
liberalise these sectors, it is clear that the poor are not the reason private companies 
are willing to take over energy supply in most developing countries and, as a result, 
are often denied access to improvements in services that may accrue. By far the 
greatest consumers and beneficiaries of such developments are industry and the rich 
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that can afford to be supplied. Often indeed the energy is transferred overseas. Over 
80% of the World Bank Group’s support for oil projects in the last decade have been 
export-oriented oil projects, primarily supplying consumers in North America, 
Western Europe, Japan and Australia.
38  
 
In rural areas more sustainable forms of solar or wind energy are often more 
appropriate for meeting livelihood needs than coal-fired power stations, for example, 
which are principally designed to meet urban industrial needs but which often 
externalise short term human health and environmental costs onto the poor.  The same 
goes for oil. In relation to the Extractive Industries Review commissioned by the 
World Bank in 2001, the Sustainable Energy and Economy Network claims; ‘Over 
the course of two years of examination, the World Bank Group was unable to provide 
an example of a single instance where an oil project alleviated poverty. Many 
examples were provided of oil projects that exacerbated poverty’.
39  
 
While there may be a case for supporting fossil-fuel energy developments in some 
cases, where alternatives are under-developed or not practically implemented, the 
sooner the transition to sustainable forms of energy commences, the easier will be the 
adjustment. There is no doubt, should they be willing, that multilateral development 
banks and donors could play a key role in enabling that transition. In many ways, their 
function would be merely to assist those efforts already being made by many 
developing countries themselves to promote sustainable forms of energy production. 
India and China have begun to put resources into the development of renewable 
energy, for example, and the declaration of the Brasilia Platform on Renewable 
Energies set a goal for Latin American countries to meet 10% of their total energy 
consumption from renewables by 2010. 
 
Taken further, however, a critique of an argument for coherence and policy screening 
would question why climate change policy objectives should trump other competing 
development goals, especially when many important uncertainties remain. As the 
World Bank acknowledges; ‘Striking the right balance between vital energy 
development and protection of the environment is complex in theory and even more 
challenging in practice’.
40 The issue is not to construct a new hierarchy of policy 
priorities, however, but to bring about a degree of policy integration such that policies 
aimed at reducing the threat of climate change are not systematically undermined by 
the effects of trade, aid and development policy more generally. It is not about 
diverting money to climate change or creating new climate policies. It is about 
reviewing existing industrial and other polices that accelerate the climate change 
which the donor community acknowledges is exacerbating poverty. As the 
environmental group SEEN note, ‘Numerous studies have identified the poor as the 
most vulnerable to climate change. In this sense, the Bank’s financing of fossil fuels is 
putting its own clients at risk’.
41 
 
A role for adaptation 
                                                 
38 SEEN (Sustainable Energy and Economy Network) SEEN key facts (www.seen.org), February, 2004. 
39 Ibid 
40 IFC (2000) Fuel for Thought: An environmental strategy for the energy sector Environment 
department and Energy, Mining and Telecoms department, Washington D.C: World Bank. 
41 SEEN, ‘Talking Points’ on World Bank Group response to NGO submissions to its ‘Extractive 
Industries Review’. Accessed from Can-talk, NGO e-mail list on climate change.   10
 
Alongside mitigation efforts it is also important to address the significance of 
adaptation efforts aimed at helping the poorest and most vulnerable adapt to the 
reality of climate change that they are already living with. There is a strong case for 
reducing the impact of climate change on the poor by integrating adaptation responses 
into development planning as suggested by donors in their Poverty and Climate 
Change report
42 and by the OECD.
43 Decades of inaction now mean that short-term 
adaptation is imperative. If, however, the efforts of the development community 
become narrowly preoccupied with this admittedly important contribution, we may  
miss an important opportunity to reconsider the role of aid and development policy in 
promoting forms of development that continue to exacerbate climate change. Clearly 
it is not a question of choosing mitigation over adaptation, as donors acknowledge. 
Both are important. But to leave climate mitigation strategies to environment 
ministries while development bureaucrats channel all their efforts into adaptation 
would be a mistake given the pressing need for policy coherence across government.  
 
While donors in the Poverty and Climate Change report call for ‘steps towards 
mainstreaming climate issues into all national, sub-national and sectoral planning 
processes such as Poverty Reduction Strategies or national strategies for sustainable 
development’,
44 the focus is on piggy-backing on other institutional processes that 
build ‘the resilience of countries, communities and households to all types of shocks, 
including climate change impacts’. Integration, according, to the definition used in the 
report, occurs ‘when specific adaptation measures are added to design and 
implementation strategies’.
45 The same logic of mainstreaming could be applied, with 
tremendous effect, if it dealt with the design stage of policies in sectors that cause 
climate change in the first place.  
 
There is clearly a need for more funds for adaptation, beyond those currently available 
via both the GEF and other adaptation related bilateral aid. Donors can both work to 
leverage maximum adaptation results within existing development activities and 
investments as well as support monitoring and evaluation of mainstreaming processes 
to build up a body of understanding to inform policy about what works, when and for 
whom.
46 At the moment, the linkages are not being well made. An OECD analysis of 
ODA flows to six developing countries indicates a significant proportion of that aid is 
directed at activities affected by climate risks.
47  
 
The impacts of climate change on the poor will also impact upon the reconstruction 
and disaster relief work of aid agencies. Though it is not yet clear whether climate 
change is directly implicated in the rising number of ‘natural’ disasters which have 
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struck developing countries in recent years. Impacts associated with climate change 
certainly exacerbate existing vulnerabilities to dramatic environmental change. Parks 
and Roberts argue, for example, that hurricane Mitch in Honduras ‘serves as a parable 
about uneven vulnerability to global climate change’.
48 ECLAC  estimated  that  $5 
billion would be necessary to fund reconstruction efforts to say nothing of damage to 
the banana plantations that were so central to generating export revenue that fell to 
one fifth of their pre-hurricane levels, forcing Dole and Chiquita to lay off 25,000 
workers and setting in train a series of other devastating social consequences. 
Likewise, the torrential rains and tropical cyclones which struck Mozambique and 
surrounding countries in 1999 left 700 people dead, 1 million people displaced as well 
as extensive losses of land, animals and other means of survival leaving a 
reconstruction bill of $700 million.
49  How to construct effective mechanisms of 
adaptation raises issues of distributive and procedural justice, the former focussing on 
the incidence of consequences of adaptive responses and the latter on how decisions 
on adaptation are made.
50  
 
Beyond the construction of solutions from above, it is also important to recognise the 
tremendous ability and experience poor people bring to coping with change and 
adversity and to design adaptation strategies that build on those coping strategies and 
ways of living with risk.
51 Vulnerability to climate change is not strictly synonymous 
with poverty even if living in poverty means access to resources, services and 
entitlements and to institutions with the capacity to protect and deliver and access is 
likely to be significantly reduced. As Adger et al note; ‘Since climate is inherently 
variable for quite natural reasons, human societies have always and everywhere had to 
develop coping strategies in the face of unwelcome variations in climate or weather 
extremes’.
52  When farmers in Nigeria manage to achieve continued increases in per 
capita agricultural production at a time of increasing aridity and population growth or 
when the government in Bangladesh has been able to provide shelters that reduce 
mortalities from cyclones, the challenge is to identify what resource and institutional 
changes made these forms of adaptation possible and effective.
53 The  National 
Adaptation Plans being set up under the Least Developed Countries Fund agreed at 
the Marrakech meeting in 2001 provide an important opportunity to build on these 
lessons. Integrating these plans with National Strategies for Sustainable Development 
and action plans associated with other environmental agreements on biodiversity and 
desertification for example will improve their chances of making lasting change. 
Table 2 summarises some emerging lessons on climate change and adaptation. 
 
 
Table 2: Climate Change and Adaptation 
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•  Climate change will lead to new patterns of disease driven by temperature and 
rainfall variation. Promoting proactive, rather than reactive, health services is a 
priority
54 
•  Uncertainty over rainfall levels will create significant challenges for managing water 
and sanitation. Demands on water supplies will increase while replenishment will be 
less predictable, requiring dedicated water conservation, leak reduction and 
educational programmes
55 
•  Changes to the climate will affect agriculture and food insecurity. Innovative 
conservation farming techniques are required and seasonal climate forecasts must be 
used to inform well-integrated crop management decisions.
56 
•  As climate change causes more intense and possibly more frequent hyro-
meteorological hazards, considering how to make disaster risk reduction more 
climate-sensitive is particularly important.
57 
 
Source: Mitchell and Tanner (2006) 
 
There is a challenge, therefore, for donors to improve coordination and to ‘take the 
lead in internalizing climate issues in all their work’ even requiring the ‘possible 
modification of their own institutional processes to ensure climate vulnerability is 
addressed with due diligence’.
58 Acknowledging, as the report does, that adaptation 
efforts are poorly embedded across governments because of the concentration of work 
within Ministries of Environment, which have limited links and leverage over other 
line ministries, could be the starting point for moves to integrate mitigation efforts 
across government. After all, the ability to adapt is linked to, not separate from, the 





The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol is often 
highlighted as a great development opportunity for developing countries to use 
climate related funds to invest in projects and technologies that benefit the poor.
60 The 
projects it approves are meant to capture social and environmental benefits and meant 
to be additional to projects that would have been funded anyway. In reality, conflicts 
between the views of investors and stakeholders hosting the projects, limited capacity 
to oversee and implement the projects in developing countries and concerns about 
both the social impacts of projects as well as the extent to which they limit host 
countries future mitigation options, leaving only higher cost domestic mitigation 
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56 See FAO web site on the impact of climate change on food security www.fao.org/clim 
57 See Tearfund, Reducing Risk of Disaster in Our Communities 
http://tilz.tearfund.org/Publications/ROOTs/Reducing+risk+of+disaster+in+our+communities.htm  
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Adaptation (Washington D.C: World Bank Group, 2003), p. 29. 
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activities, make these gains harder to achieve.
61 Some expectations about the income 
that would be generated for poorer groups by such activities have been unfulfilled 
with currently low levels of investment in sectors such as forestry, for example (see 
box 1).
62 There is perhaps a fortunate coincidence, nevertheless, that those countries 
that have been the main actors in project based emissions reductions through the 
CDM are also key aid donors: the UK, Japan and the Netherlands such that 
environment-development synergies should, in theory, be easier to realise in practice. 
 
Many of the concerns that relate to CDM projects also apply to the AIJ (Activities 
Implemented Jointly) which preceded the CDM that allow bilateral projects to be set 
up between largely Northern investors and Southern implementing agencies in areas 
such as renewable energy, energy efficiency, fuel switching projects and land and 
forestry projects. The idea of funding GHG reduction projects in areas of the world 
where it is both cheapest to do and where the greatest gains can be achieved, grew in 
popularity in the wake of the conclusion of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change in 1992. Despite criticisms about the verifiability of gains achieved 
under such projects, particularly in the absence of clear rules and mechanisms of 
oversight at that time, and about the potential for such projects to distract attention 
away from the pressing need to encourage industrialised countries to reduce their own 
domestic emissions,
63 the popularity of the idea meant that attention turned to ways of 
managing the projects in a way that ensured meaningful additional gains. Hence a 
pilot phase for AIJ activities was set up to ‘learn by doing’. According to the Kyoto 
Protocol, actions implemented jointly have to be ‘additional to any that would 
otherwise occur’ and ‘supplemental to domestic actions’. Scope is provided to include 
‘verifiable changes in stocks of sinks’ in parties’ assessment of their net GHG 
emissions (Article 6). It was established at the COP1 (Conference of the Parties) 
meeting that all projects are meant to be ‘compatible with and supportive of national 
environment and development priorities and strategies’. The majority of projects to 
date continue to be in the area of energy rather than forest projects. As of the seventh 
synthesis report in 2006 there have been 157 projects under the pilot phase of the AIJ. 
  
The brokers that mediate deals between investors and local organisations have a key 
role in determining who wins and loses from these transactions. Often NGOs or 
research institutions create and administer trust funds towards this end. In contrast to 
CDM projects, investors do not receive formal carbon credits but rather benefit from 
positive publicity and sometimes tax cuts in their country of origin. This is in spite of 
the sometimes high transaction costs associated with project management and 
interaction with government representatives from their point of view.
64 Parties are 
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encouraged to report on their AIJ under the pilot phase using a uniform reporting 
format and most parties have a designated national authority to act as a primary 
national contact for AIJ. The reviews produced for the Conferences of the Parties 
have revealed an imbalance in the spread of projects, an issue which has dogged the 
CDM too, particularly the lack of projects in Africa and small-island developing 
states. Economies in transition still host the majority of AIJ projects. Joint 
Implementation projects, in contrast to AIJ, can be claimed against countries 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol through emission reduction units (ERUs).   
Projects starting as of the year 2000 may be eligible as JI projects if they meet the 
relevant requirements, but ERUs may also be issued for a crediting period starting 
after the beginning of 2008. These transactions are overseen by the Joint 
Implementation Advisory Committee. An Annex 1 (industrialised country) can also 
authorize a legal entity to participate in JI projects. One attraction of working with 
accredited NGOs in this sense is the prospect of reducing transaction costs. 
 
Larger-scale projects also offer the prospect of gaining economies of scale. In the case 
of the CDM project in Guangxi China, overseen by the BioCarbon Fund with funding 
from Italy and Spain, a watershed management project has been set up in the Pearl 
River basin aimed at saving 25,795 metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent per year. 
Alongside this, there has been renewed emphasis on small-scale sinks projects 
implemented by low-income communities in the CDM such as forest carbon projects. 
According to Boyd et al, the key is adapting these projects to local realities on the 
ground, ‘capitalizing on synergies with other rural development strategies, ensuring 
stakeholder participation by working with accountable, representative local 
organisations and creating flexible and adaptive project designs.’
65  Carbon 
sequestration through forest projects is appealing from a developed country point of 
view and may even generate much needed revenue for developing countries.
66 Annual 
flows of official overseas aid for forestry development in poor communities could be 
vastly outstripped by private financial flows of up to $300 million per year through 
carbon credits for sequestered carbon.
67 But it does raise issues of whose forests are 
involved, who has a right to earn revenue from them, whose property rights are 
affected and what other livelihoods might be displaced by the use of the forests as a 






Box 1: Sinks project case study 
 
The Fondo Bioclimatico project in Chiapas Mexico has been part funded by the UK based 
Future Forests which buys carbon and sells it to those wanting to offset their greenhouse 
emissions.  Fondo Bioclimatico is a reference to the trust fund created to manage and 
administer carbon investments.  
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During the last 5 years the project has grown from an initial group of 47 campesinos to more 
than 450 carbon suppliers from 20 communities across Chiapas. Every producer or 
community involved has to produce their own forest management strategy which, once 
approved by project developers, means they receive an up-front payment of 20% of the 
carbon expected to accrue from the plan. They receive 60% annually of the sale price per 
tonne of carbon sequestered and the remaining 40% is set aside to cover the costs of technical 
support for farmers, administrative costs, monitoring and reporting. Access to land to be used 
in this way has been restricted to 1-2 ha per producer in order to promote income inequality 
across members and communities. The maximum income gain for producers, which is 
dependent on the forestry management system and its carbon sequestration potential, has been 
estimated at about US$ 700 over 10 years, ‘a modest but significant amount relative to local 
incomes’. 
 
Source: Brown and Corbera 2003 
 
Other critiques have picked up on this issue of the global South being reconstituted as 
a sink for Northern emissions, most critically referred to as ‘carbon colonialism’.
68 
Even senior government officials within the climate change negotiations such as 
Estrada noted at the time of the Kyoto agreement: 
 
My reservation was that the CDM is considered a form of joint implementation but I don’t 
understand how a commitment can be jointly implemented if only one of the parties involved 
is committed to limit emissions and the other party is free from a qualitative point of view. 
Such disparity has been at the root of every colonisation since the time of the Greeks.
69  
 
Indeed, there have been examples of negative impacts on the poor when land is given 
up for carbon sink purposes. For example a Norwegian company operating in Uganda 
that leased its’ lands for a sequestration project resulted in 8,000 people in thirteen 
villages being evicted.
70  The project in Bukaleba Forestry Reserve was meant to 
offset GHG emissions of a coal fired power plant to be built in Norway. International 
criticism at the time prevented the project from claiming carbon credits to ‘offset’ the 
power plant emissions, but the project continued and the trees were planted. After 
lengthily negotiations, the Norwegian owners accepted to allocate less than 5% of the 
land they received from the government at a ‘bargain price’ to the local people 
previously threatened with eviction. According to one NGO ‘The eucalyptus trees 
chosen for the project appear to have been a poor choice for the local site. Local 




Nevertheless, on a more positive note the potential for participation in such projects to 
generate needed revenue with the World Bank estimating that the CDM will absorb 
up to $2 billion per year in investments by 2008, has, to some extent, unsettled the 
traditional stance of developing countries against involvement in a climate regime on 
the grounds that the primary cause of the problem and therefore key responsibility for 
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tackling it resided with the developed world. The problem is that investors have been 
attracted to those areas where ‘low-hanging fruit’ are plentiful and the management 
institutions much stronger. By 2008, according to World Bank figures, 80% of CDM 
investments will go to Brazil, India and China.
72 There is clearly a geographically 




Technology clearly has a key role to play in mitigation and adaptation to climate 
change. There has been concern that climate change does not become the latest policy 
arena in which to repeat previous mistakes in development policy about the 
inappropriate transfer of technology as aid to the global South.
73 Concerns  about 
subsidies to flailing technology sectors whose applications are inappropriate to local 
Southern contexts for which they were not designed, the use of conditionalities and 
tied aid which requires recipients to purchase the technology from the donor have all 
re-surfaced as legitimate concerns expressed by developing countries in the climate 
change debate.
74 Much of the controversy has also centred on the Global Environment 
Facility set up to oversee North-South transfers of environmental aid. Its close ties to 
the World Bank to whom it is chiefly accountable has been a particular source of 
concern for many developing countries.
75  
 
Alongside the use of technologies intended to bring about a degree of leap-frogging to 
a more sustainable energy path, there have been calls to develop spectacular techno-
fixes to the problem of climate change. Designed to avoid having to take politically 
sensitive action to mitigate emissions, such grand designs include filling the oceans 
with iron fillings to increase the rate at which they absorb CO2 or the use of huge 
mirrors placed in the atmosphere to deflect the suns rays. Given the numerous issues 
about the plausibility and desirability of such global techno-fixes, I will not focus 
further attention on them.  
 
Intermediate technology, on the other hand, may have a key role in promoting climate 
friendly short term solutions to pressing poverty needs. Here the ‘development first’ 
approach is in evidence, as well as efforts to capitalise on the synergies noted in table 
3. The work of development NGOs such as Practical Action (formerly the 
Intermediate Technology and Development Group) epitomises this approach. The 
group works with local communities to improve their energy security through 
designing sustainable energy technologies that use renewable energy sources and 
involve the community in the design and maintenance of appropriate projects. 
Examples include micro-hydro plants, small scale wind generators, solar lanterns and 
biogas plants. In the case of small scale wind power generators, these can charge up 
the vehicle batteries that are used by hundreds of thousands of off-grid households to 
light their homes.
76  
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In more general terms, as Tompkins and Adger show,
77 in terms of political priorities 
and resource demands, there are some difficult trade-offs to face between investment 
in the development and diffusion of new technology and investment in encouraging 
and enabling society to change its behaviour and or adopt a new technology. They 
suggest: ‘The preference for a more technological response as opposed to a policy 
response that focuses on changing social behaviour will be influenced by the capacity 
of different societies to change the climate; perceived vulnerability to climate impacts 
and capacity to modify social behaviour and the physical environment.’
78 
 
Some tough choices lie ahead. In a world of limited development finance, countries 
have to prioritise among these options and between environment and development 
goals. Developing countries have distinct and competing interests and while many 
Latin American countries have been in favour of including forestry projects under the 
CDM given their endowments of these resources, other areas of the world are 
concerned about a consequent reduction in transfers of technology and finance. 
Clearly there is a role for all these solutions, but the extent of it has to be judged on a 
case by case basis rather than presented as a ‘one-size fits all’ solution to climate 
change and development. There is an added challenge here for donors, each with their 
own sense of priorities in this area and with closer ties to some parts of the developing 
world than others, to coordinate their work to build on strengths and comparative 
advantages, share expertise and lesson-learning and avoid duplication even if joint 
projects offer a useful way of reducing transaction costs.  
 
It would be easy to argue that priorities for projects, technology development and 
other forms of development assistance should be focussed in those areas where there 
is a clear and substantial developmental as well as environmental gain. Davidson et al 
refer to this as a ‘development first approach’ in which a future climate regime should 
focus on development strategies with ancillary climate benefits and increase the 
capability of developing countries to implement these.
79 Placing the priority on the 
developmental over the environmental gains would appear legitimate given who is 
being asked to host these climate projects (people in the South) and those who 
contributed most to the problem and claim to be most concerned about it (people in 
the North). The reality, however, in the light of what we increasingly know, is that 
failure to achieve a meaningful short-term environmental gain is likely to offset short-
term developmental gains. The two are intimately connected (see table 3). 
 
 
Table 3: Exploring synergies: Climate Change and Development 
 
•  Reducing fossil fuel consumption contributes to the abatement of urban and regional 
air pollution and the reduction of health risks, but also contributes to reducing climate 
risks 
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•  Agro-forestry projects protect soils and provide employment opportunities for local 
farmers, but also result in carbon sequestration 
•  Coastal zone management activities not only protect against extreme events due to 
climate variability, but also strengthen the capacity of local communities to deal with 
the impacts of sea-level rise and provide a resource base for local livelihoods. 
•  Development of drought resistant crops to reduce farmers’ vulnerability to current 
climate variability and future changes in the climate. 
 





A key challenge in strengthening the resilience and effectiveness of institutions at all 
levels to tackle climate change is to address the ‘participation gap’. Improving the 
voice of developing countries as representatives of those groups most affected by 
climate change will be key to shaping a regime that responds more directly to the 
needs of poorer groups in the GHG reduction targets it sets and the rules constructed 
for use of the Kyoto mechanisms. There is precedent for such an effort and UNCTAD, 
amongst others, has sought to build the capacity of Southern delegations through 
programmes around trade for example that could be applied to the issue of climate 
change.
80Table 4 provides some examples. These are aimed at building understanding 
of how institutions work: their mandates, responsibilities and decision-making 
procedures as well as improving levels of legal and scientific literacy, especially 
relevant in environmental negotiations where there is a premium on these forms of 
knowledge in basing policy on complex and evolving science and the careful 
negotiation of legal text in international treaties.  
 
There have also been attempts to among donors and multilaterals to fund the 
participation of government and NGO delegates from the South which might be 
applied to climate negotiations. Procedures exist, for example, within the GEF to fund 
the attendance of NGOs from developing country NGOs at GEF meetings through a 
voluntary fund to which members contribute. As developing countries become 
increasingly involved in both mitigation and adaptation efforts, it will be crucial to 
encourage international organisations, governments and civil society to do all they can 
to improve the participation and understanding of developing country governments 
and civil societies in activities and rule-making which increasingly impinges upon 
their development prospects. 




Table 4: Creating voice: Capacity building for LDCs 
 
1.  Recognizing the need for technical assistance on trade and environment in favour of 
developing countries and countries with economies in transition, UNCTAD and 
UNEP launched, in 2000, a Capacity-Building Task Force for Trade, Environment 
and Development (CBTF). The objective is to help developing countries enhance 
                                                 
80 This work has been undertaken in relation both to trade and environmental negotiations and involves 
NGOs with significant legal expertise such as FIELD (Foundation for International Environmental Law 
and Development)   19
understanding of trade, environment linkages, address trade-related environmental 
and environment-related trade problems and participate effectively in international 
negotiations.
81 Activities towards this end include: 
•  Policy dialogues and briefings with Geneva-based delegations  
•  Regional seminars on specific issues  
•  National policy dialogues to facilitate policy-coordination on key issues, preferably 
based on a multi-stakeholder process and with the active involvement of the private 
sector and other members of civil society.  
•  Training seminars (3 to 4 days)  
•  National capacity-building projects  
2.  Specifically around trade issues, UNCTAD has also designed a programme on 
‘Technical assistance and capacity building for developing countries, especially 
LDCs, and economies in transition in support of their participation in the WTO Post-
Doha work programme’. This deals with specific issues that developing countries 
face in trade policy in the ‘development round’.   
3. One such area would be Intellectual Property Rights. The Capacity Building Project on 
(IPRs) and Sustainable Development is being implemented by UNCTAD and the 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) over two years.
82 The 
main goals of the project are as follows: 
a. To improve understanding of the development implications of the TRIPS Agreement. 
b. To strengthen the analytical and negotiating capacity of developing countries so that they 
are better able to participate in IPR-related negotiations in an informed fashion in furtherance 
of their sustainable development objectives.  
 
 
A second key institutional challenge is policy coherence. Policy coherence is perhaps 
the greatest contribution that governments can make towards providing climate 
protection and it is also potentially the least economically costly. By ensuring that 
policies in areas such as energy, agriculture, transport and industry are designed with 
the imperative of climate protection in mind, governments will be going along way 
towards addressing the problem of climate change in a way that helps to avoid the 
need for expensive mitigation and adaptation projects at a later stage. The goal of 
policy integration has been clearly articulated, even if not fully practiced, by the EU 
and there are lessons from this experience which could guide other governments’ 
responses to climate change.
83   Within developing countries, Poverty Reduction 
Strategy papers provide an important opportunity to integrate climate concerns, to 
mainstream adaptation and to build in some of the synergies suggested in table 3.
84 
We need to be attentive here to avoiding the pitfalls of mainstreaming where the issue 
loses visibility and as a result becomes easier to ignore and impact becomes harder to 
trace, a fact which may diminish donor interest and the prospects of future funding. 
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What this means is not viewing climate change as an isolated problem, but rather as a 
product of a whole series of policy choices about economic and energy strategy that 
need to be revised to ensure minimal impact on climate change. Otherwise the effects 
of actions taken to protect the climate will continue to be systematically offset by 
decisions taken in policy areas such as energy, trade, transport and agriculture. At the 
moment, governments’ professed commitments to tackle climate change, expressed in 
the Kyoto Protocol, are being undermined by their continued support for financial 
institutions that promote activities that generate vast amounts of greenhouse gases. As 
Tellam puts it; ‘While the governments of industrialised countries continue to 
publicly state their commitment to dealing with the climate issue under the Kyoto 
Protocol, they continue to work with the World Bank, with multilateral development 
banks and with export credit agencies to directly or indirectly finance the 
development of energy systems in low-income countries based on fossil-fuels’.
85  
 
At national level, decisions by governments in areas such as trade, agriculture, energy 
and transport that are taken without regard to their climate footprint, have the same 
counter productive effect. The decision by the UK government to approve a new 
terminal at Heathrow airport, already the one of the world’s busiest, has the potential 
to single-handedly undo the emissions savings likely to be achieved by all other 
proposed actions. Anderson et al show that if the aviation industry is allowed to grow 
at rates even lower than those being experienced today, the EU could see aviation 
accounting for between 39% and 79% of its total carbon budget by 2050. In the case 
of the UK, this means that all other sectors of the UK economy would need to reduce 
their carbon emissions significantly in order to allow the aviation industry to grow at 
even moderate rates.
86 Addressing these sorts of policy contradictions is critical to 
reducing the climate risks the rich impose on the poor. 
 
Until now climate change has rightly been viewed as a rich country problem. It has 
been largely created by the fossil fuel intensive patterns of industrialisation from 
which we have benefited in Europe, North America and East Asia. The problem is 
that the impacts of climate change will be, many argue already are, being felt most 
acutely by the world’s poorest nations. In addition, the rapid industrialisation of parts 
of South-East Asia, China and South America has created a situation in which the 
former North-South dynamic has given way to a recognition that many of countries 
within these regions will join the ranks of the largest polluters within the next two 
decades. Whereas development practitioners are used to working with the poor, with 
climate change we have to recognise that to avert further displacement and suffering 
as a result of climate change, we need to identify and enforce a new set of policy 
mechanisms in the industrialised and new industrialising world for integrating climate 
change objectives within policy areas that have traditionally been perceived to have 
nothing to do with either development or environment. This requires us to look not 
only at the activities of governments, but at the international institutions and market 
actors that shape so strongly the direction of national development strategies. 
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We have seen heightened attention in recent years to the use of market mechanisms 
for tackling climate change. From carbon taxes, to emissions trading schemes and 
voluntary efforts by market actors, we have seen the increasing use of market-based 
forms of climate governance. We have noted many of these mechanisms in this paper. 
But it is clear that the potential of market mechanisms to realise their potential to meet 
the needs of poorer groups is contingent on strong institutions being in place to set 
targets, monitor performance, allocate (and re-allocate) property rights and establish 
clear rules and procedures for such mechanisms. Carbon markets are created by 
global and national institutions often overturning long-established traditional 
management and property regimes in their wake.
87 As noted above in relation to CDM 
projects, this can create conflicts between the needs and preferences of investors, 
brokers, NGOs and local community members. Brown and Corbera argue ‘the ability 
of the ‘new carbon economy’ to provide real benefits for sustainable development 
may ultimately be constrained by the nature of the market itself’.
88  
 
Mediating conflicts and ensuring particularly that the needs of poorer groups are 
protected is a critical role for institutions through (i) regulation (ii) participation and 
(iii) representation. This is as true of local institutions as it is of the CDM executive 
board which oversees project approvals against defined social and environmental 
criterion. It will be central to delivering the three types of equity that Brown and 
Corbera identify: equity in access, equity and legitimacy in institutions and decision-
making at all scales and equity in outcome. Their work in Mexico (see box 1) shows 
clearly that where organisations for forest management and managerial capacity are 
present, communities are more likely to benefit. Given the different vulnerabilities 
that social groups face institutions have to ensure that benefits flow to poorer groups 
since currently it is those farmers with larger holdings that are able to risk setting 
aside a portion of their land for reforestation and poorer groups without such access 
that cannot. As they suggest:
89  
 
These three elements need to be addressed if instruments such as the Kyoto mechanisms can 
make any claim to sustainability. At a minimum, such initiatives require robust and equitable 
institutions at the local level and means of distributing financial benefits to the stakeholders 






Building coalitions for the sorts of climate change and development agenda I am 
proposing here will not be easy and will not be achieved any time soon. Donors, 
NGOs and others willing to embrace this approach will find themselves pitted in 
opposition against the most powerful elements of government and their allies in 
industry that are strongly attached to fossil-fuel led growth trajectories. Arguing that 
there is an overwhelming developmental and environmental case for revising many 
conventional economic strategies may not make much headway with hard headed 
officials from trade and finance ministries. This is in spite of growing evidence of the 
                                                 
87 Brown, K. and E. Corbera (2003) ‘Exploring equity and sustainable development in the new carbon 
economy’ Climate Policy Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 41-56. 
88 Ibid p. 41. 
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minimal costs associated with taking action on climate change, especially when set 
against the potential costs of not taking action.
90 
 
There is a case that can and is being made, however, on grounds of the enormous 
savings to be made from ‘win-win’, ‘no-regrets’ policy options that can be achieved 
in the short-term, at little cost and can be justified on many grounds other than the 
seriousness of tackling climate change as a problem in its own right. Making the case 
that a truly ‘joined-up’ approach to policy on climate change may mean revising some 
policies, or dropping others altogether, will take longer and be resisted fiercely. In the 
first instance, it means recognising the nonsense of one set of policies, allegedly 
aimed at enhancing welfare, systematically undermining the asset base on which all 
economic activity depends. Ultimately, it means recognising that if trade, energy, 
transport and agricultural policy are more substantively oriented to the goal of 
sustainability, there should be no need for a separate climate policy. This might 
require us to revisit our faith in a model of economic development that appears to be 
increasingly at odds with the goal of stabilising the climate system which so directly 
impacts upon the livelihoods of the poor.  
 
Ignorance about the effects of our actions upon the poor is increasingly not a viable 
excuse for inaction. We can expect more resort to legal actions by those affected by 
climate change.
91 Perhaps the prospect of direct and substantial financial losses by 
key polluters will provide sufficient incentive to act on this issue. The experience of 
the insurance industry should serve as a timely reminder, however, of the ability of 
business to cut its losses and protect itself from liabilities without fundamentally dis-
investing from a fossil fuel based carbon economy.
92 Financial incentives go so far. A 
strong moral case can nevertheless be built that it is ethically unacceptable to reduce 
the life chances of the majority of humanity in order to sustain the excessive and 
unsustainable consumption of rich world elites.  
 
If a rights-based approach to development is to mean anything it must surely start 
with the premise that no one has the right to deny others the right to life. We are now 
entering a stage in climate politics, where that is not only a possibility, it is a 
probability. This fact alone should ensure that climate change assumes a central place 
in efforts to promote sustainable human development. 
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